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COMMENTS
THE USUFRUCT OF THE SURVIVING SPOUSE
Louisiana law gives a surviving spouse many benefits,1 but
the usufruct of the surviving spouse under Civil Code article 916
is probably the most important.2 This institution is relatively
modern and seems to exemplify a feeling in civilian countries
during the late nineteenth century that a surviving spouse
should be given more benefits than those already provided.3 The
principal purpose of the usufruct was obviously to help the sur-
viving spouse more adequately sustain himself and his children
after termination of the marriage by death.4 Today, after the
inauguration of social security, various welfare programs, and
private and public insurance and pension plans, the importance
of the usufruct in terms of its fundamental purpose has certainly
decreased. Yet it would be premature to conclude it no longer
has vitality, for the usufruct has other useful functions. For
example, if the husband predeceases the wife, the usufruct in-
sures that the wife may continue to live in the family home, and
if the wife predeceases the husband he may continue operation
of a community business unrestricted by the desires of her
heirs. This Comment analyzes the statutory requisites for the
usufruct and their judicial interpretation.
1. For example, the inheritance of the surviving spouse provided by LA. CivIL
CODE art. 915 (1870); the usufruct of the surviving spouse provided by id.
art. 916; the marital fourth provided by id. art. 2382; the widow's homestead,
provided by id. art. 3252.
2. Id. art. 916: "In all cases, when the predeceased husband or wife shall have
left issue of the marriage with the survivor, and shall not have disposed by last
will and testament, of his or her share in the community property, the survivor
shall hold a (sic) usufruct, during his or her natural life, so much of the share
of a deceased in such community property as may be inherited by such issue. This
usufruct shall cease, however, whenever the survivor shal lenter into a second
marriage."
3. Louisiana was one of the first civil law jurisdictions to award this benefit
to the surviving spouse, it being established by La. Acts 1844, No. 152, § 2.
France did not adopt a similar institution until 1891. For a comprehensive discus-
sion of the French development of this institution see Oppenheim, The Usufruct of
the Surviving Spouse, 18 TuL. L. REV. 181 (1943).
4. See Succession of Teller, 49 La. Ann. 281, 21 So. 265 (1897) ; Succession
of Moore, 40 La. Ann. 431, 4 So. 460 (188) ; State Dep't of Highways v.
Costello, 158 So. 2d 850 (La. App. 4th Cir, 1964) ; Magee v. Gatlin, 51 So. 2d
154 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1951).
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Requisites for the Usufruct
Under article 916 the surviving spouse acquires the usufruct
of the deceased's share of the community property if certain
conditions are fulfilled: first, the marriage must be under the
community of acquets and gains; second, there must be issue of
the marriage with the deceased spouse; third, the deceased
spouse must not have disposed of his share in the community by
testament; fourth, the usufruct attaches only to that portion of
the deceased's share in the community which is inherited by
issue of the marriage; and fifth, the usufruct endures only so
long as the surviving spouse does not remarry.5 The first condi-
tion, that a community property regime exist, is self-explana-
tory." However, each of the other conditions deserves consid-
eration.
5. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 916 (1879), quoted in note 2 aupra.
6. See Comment, 25 LA. L. REV. 95 (1964), which deals with the general prin-
ciples regarding composition of the community of acquets and gains.
Two interesting questions may be posed: first, would the usufruct attach if
there is no legal community, but purely conventional one established by marriage
contract, or a modified legal community; second, why was not similar protection
given to the survivor in the case where there was no community property?
The first question may be academic today, since seldom is the legal community
modified by marriage contract. However, there is nothing to indicate that the
usufruct would not exist if the community of property resulted from convention
rather than operation of law. Additional problems may be presented as to whether
the surviving spouse under other than a purely legal community could be deprived
of the usufruct, as is possible in the case of the purely legal community. LA.
CIVIL CODE art. 2326 (1870) provides that the spouses may not by agreement
"alter the legal order of descents, either with respect to themselves, in what con-
cerns the inheritance of their children or posterity, or with respect to their chil-
dren between themselves, without any prejudice to the donations inter vivos or
mortis causa . . . ." It seems the better position would be to hold that this
article would not prevent deprivation of the usufruct. Article 916, in relation to
the purely legal community, clearly does allow deprivation of the usufruct, and
there seems no sound reason to make a distinction here. Further, article 2326
is susceptible of the interpretation that granting the usufruct in other than the
legal community would not be a change in the order of descent, but only in the
quantum of the chlidren's inheritance. It might be contended that the order is
changed in regard to the surviving spouse; however, under the jurisprudence this
could not be admitted as an answer since it is established that the usufruct does
not pass by inheritance. See Succession of Marsal, 118 La. 212, 42 So. 778
(1907).
In relation to the second question, it seems at first glance that the policy
underlying article 916 should operate even more strongly to favor a usufruct
where there is no community property. However, if article 916 is construed as an
impingement upon the legitime of forced heirs. Succession of Moore, 40 La. Ann.
531, 4 So. 460 (1888), it appears evident that the lawmakers simply were not
willing to deviate so far from the principles of forced heirship. Where there is no
community property, LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1710 (1870), quoted in note 11 infra,
probably reflects the lawmakers' intent.
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Issue of the Marriage
In accordance with the terms of article 916 the courts have
refused to allow the usufruct to attach to decedent's community
property inherited by children of a former marriage. 7 If there
are issue of the last marriage and children of a former mar-
riage, the usufruct burdens only the part inherited by issue of
the last marriage.8 Why did the lawmaker impose this require-
ment, when it seems more likely that children of a former mar-
riage would prevent the surviving wife from keeping the family
home or the surviving husband from continuing a community
business than would issue of the last marriage? There are two
possible justifications for this restriction. First, the surviving
spouse is not legally obligted to support the deceased's children
by a former marriage. Article 2279 of the Civil Code provides
that parents, by the act of marrying, contract to support their
children. Obviously, this rule was not intended to encompass
the non-parental spouse under a second marriage, since he is in
the position of a stranger to his stepchildren.' 0 Since the surviv-
ing spouse has not been placed under an obligation to support
stepchildren, the lawmaker may have believed that he should
not be permitted to encroach upon their legitime. The second
possible justification for this restriction might be found in the
rules regarding the burdening of the legitime"l and, especially, in
article 175212 of the Civil Code. At the time the usufruct of the
surviving spouse was created, 3 article 1752 allowed the deceased
7. Succession of Williams, 170 La. 245, 127 So. 615 (1930) ; Succession of
Emonot, 109 La. 359, 33 So. 368 (1902) ; Hall v. Toussaint, 52 La. Ann. 1763,
28 So. 304 (1900).
8. See note 41 infra, and accompanying text.
9. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 227 (1870) ; "Fathers and mothers, by the very act
of marrying, contract together the obligation of supporting, maintaining, and
educating their children."
10. For discussion of the rights of an adopted child in regard to the usufruct
see note 19 inIra, and accompanying text.
11. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1710 (1870) : "The same causes which, according
to the foregoing provisions of the present title, authorize an action for the revoca-
tion of a donation inter vivos, are sufficient to ground an action for revocation
of testamentary dispositions; provided, however, that no charges or conditions
can be imposed by the testator on the legitimate portion of forced heirs, nor can
they lose their inheritance for any act of ingratitude to the testaor, prior to his
decease. That he has not disinherited them shall be sufficient evidence of his hav-
ing forgiven the offense."
12. Id. art. 1752: "A man or woman who contracts a second or subsequent
marriage, having a child or children by a former marriage, can give to his wife,
or she to her husband, either by donation inter vivo8 or by last will and testament,
in full property or in usufruct, all of that portion of his estate, or her estate, as
the case may be, that he or she could legally give to a stranger."
13. La. Acts 1844, No. 152, J 2.
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to give only a child's portion in usufruct to his second spouse,
where there were issue of his former marriage. Had there been
no restriction to property inherited by issue of the last marriage,
then the usufruct would have attached to property inherited by
children of a former marriage, thus necessarily emasculating the
terms of article 1752. Arguably, later amendments to article
1752, lessening the restrictions on property that may be given
to a second spouse, evidence the feeling that this restriction is
no longer considered proper in modern society. This contention,
at best, should be given only slight weight, and the courts should
not deviate from the restriction of the usufruct to property
inheritde by issue of the marriage in absence of express legisla-
tive intent.
Surprisingly, the courts have sometimes had difficulty in
determining who is "issue of the marriage." In West v. Good-
win14 a judgment awarding the surviving spouse the usufruct
over property inherited by a grandchild, taking concurrently
with children of the marriage, was challenged by the grandchild
on the ground that he, taking in his own right, was exempt
from the operation of article 916. Without considering the valid-
ity of the contention that the grandchild inherited in his own
right, the court concluded that his portion was subject to the
usufruct, reasoning that "issue of the marriage" in article 916
must be read in pari materia with article 3556(8)15 defining
"children" to include grandchildren. While the result achieved
seems fair, the reasoning employed seems somewhat formalistic
and arbitrary; it overlooks the possibility that the redactors, by
using the term "issue of the marriage" in article 916, may have
intended to preclude application of the article 3556 (8) definition
of "children." The court's conclusion might have been strength-
ened had they recognized that the grandchild could inherit only
by representation, since children heirs of the first degree were
alive and would otherwise exclude him.16 Under the general
rules of representation, the grandchild would take only what
the predeceased child would have taken :17 the naked ownership
14. 176 La. 873, 147 So. 20 (1933).
15. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3556(8) (1870): "Children -Under this name are
comprehended, not only the children of the first degree, but the grandchildren,
greatgrandchildren, and all other descendants in the direct line."
16. See id. arts. 888, 902.
17. In some cases the representative may have greater rights than the person
being represented, but these exceptions are specifically provided by statute. For
example, see id. art. 901, which allows the child of one either disinherited, or
[Vol. XXV
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burdened by the usufruct. Had the legislature intended to devi-
ate from the doctrine of representation in article 916, seemingly
it would have given a more definite indication. Furthermore,
such an intention seems unlikely in view of the policy behind
article 916 to provide for the surviving spouse, who might be
obliged to support the grandchildren 18 and yet be deprived of
of the family home if the grandchild inherited in full ownership.
On this basis, the conclusion that grandchildren are "issue of the
marriage" follows more plausibly.
Louisiana courts also had to decide if an adopted child could
be considered issue of the marriage and thus subject to the
survivor's usufruct. The court answered this question affirma-
tively, reasoning that since legislation had placed the adopted
child in the position of a child of the marriage with respect to
the right of inheritance, 19 then the adopted child should likewise
be subject to the limitation upon the blood child's inheritance.20
This conclusion seems sound for the additional reason that in
view of the underlying policy of article 916 to provide support
for the survivor and children, any distinction between natural
and adopted children would be unfortunate.
Adverse Disposition by the Testator
The most troublesome requisite of article 916 is that the
deceased "shall not have disposed by last will and testament, of
his or her share in the community property."'21 Clearly the sur-
viving spouse is entitled to the usufruct when the deceased spouse
dies intestate,2 2 but when the decedent dies testate, the effect
of particular types of bequests on the survivor's right to the
usufruct is uncertain. Language in early cases implied that the
mere fact that decedent made a testament was enough to pre-
clude operation of article 916.23 More recently, however, the
excluded from the succession, to represent his parent if the parent predeceased the
grandparent.
18. See id. art. 229, which requires an ascendant to support a needy descendant.
19. The adopted child has broader rights than the blood child in that the
adopted child may inherit from his natural parents also. See id. art. 214; The
Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1957-1958 Term -Marriage, 19
LA. L. REV. 53, 58 (1958).
20. Succession of Teller, 49 La. Ann. 281, 21 So. 265 (1897).
21. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 916 (1870), quoted in note 2 supra.
22. Ibid.; Succession of Russell, 208 La. 213, 23 So. 2d 50 (1945) ; Kelley v.
Kelley, 198 La. 338, 3 So. 2d 641 (1941) ; Succession of Dumestre, 42 La. Ann.
411, 7 So. 624 (1890) ; Tugwell v. Tugwell, 32 La. Ann. 848 (1880).
23. See Ludowig v. Weber, 35 La. Ann. 579 (1883) ; Succession of Schiller,
33 La. Ann. 1 (1881) ; Forstall v. Forstall, 28 La. Ann. 197 (1876) ; Grayson v.
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courts have held that only a testamentary disposition adverse
to the survivor deprives him of the usufruct.2 4 Additional prob-
lems have arisen from the question whether the legitime would
be impermissibly burdened if the survivor received both the
disposable portion of the decedent's estate and the usufruct over
the remainder. The effect, or probable effect, of particular types
of bequests on the operation of article 916 can best be understood
through an examination of selected cases.
In two cases the court reached apparently conflicting con-
clusions on the effect of testaments which seemed merely to
confirm the operation of the laws of intestate succession. In
Succession of Schiller25 the will provided that the estate was to
be "distributed among my legal heirs, according to the laws now
in force in Louisiana. ' 26 The court held that the testator had
disposed of his property within the meaning of article 916; and,
consequently, that the usufruct to the surviving spouse did not
accrue. The court reasoned that when the testator makes a will,
it is presumed that he intends something different from the
result accruing in the absence of a will.27 It was concluded that
this presumption, when coupled with the testator's use of the
word "distributed," evidenced an intent that the wife should
not have the usufruct of his half of the community.28 In Succes-
sion of Maloney,2 9 however, the testatrix bequeathed all of her
property in Biloxi, Mississippi, to her three daughters and then
stated: "My interest of whatever character and wherever situ-
ated, outside of said city of Biloxi, Mississippi, I leave to be
disposed of according to the laws where the same may be."'8 0
The court, in upholding the surviving spouse's usufruct on the
Sanford, 12 La. Ann. 646 (1857) ; of. Succession of Maloney, 127 La. 913, 54 So.
146 (1911), where the usufruct was allowed, but the court made it clear that the
testator's will did not attempt to dispose of his property located in Louisiana.
24. Succession of Baker, 129 La. 74, 55 So. 714 (1911) ; Succession of Moore,
40 La. Ann. 531, 4 So. 460 (1888) ; Succession of Brown, 94 So. 2d 317 (La. App.
Orl. Cir. 1957) ; Succession of Lynch, 145 So. 42 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1932).
25. 33 La. Ann. 1 (1881).
26. Id. at 2.
27. Id. at 3: "A person that makes a will is to be presumed to own property,
and be desirous of disposing of it in a manner in which the law would not convey
it, in absence of such will. The presumption is, therefore, that such person de-
signed to substitute his will to the provisions of the law, and so to derogate, en-
tirely or partially, from the disposition which the law would have made of his
property without such will. This is true, also, even as to the title of the bequest,
or testamentary disposition."
28. Apparently, the court thought "distributed" connoted an actual putting
into possession of the forced heirs.
29. 127 La. 913, 54 So. 146 (1911).
30. Id. at 914, 54 So. at 146.
[Vol. XXV
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Louisiana property, distinguished the Schiller case on the basis
that a careful comparison of the language in respective testa-
ments indicated that in Maloney the testatrix did not purport to
dispose of the Louisiana property by will, and that the will was
intended to affect only the Mississippi property.
Despite a somewhat dubious interpretation of the testament,
Maloney appears to have reached the sounder result. The Schiller
presumption that merely drawing a will shows an intent to
deviate from the rules of intestate succession seems highly ques-
tionable when applied to a will in which the testator has re-
ferred to the existing laws. Further, reliance on such a technical
construction of "distributed" seems unwarranted in this in-
stance. The quoted language from each testament seems to mean
that the property be distributed in accordance with the laws of
intestate succession. Article 916 is certainly located in the sec-
tion of the Code dealing with intestate succession; thus both
testamentary provisions probably should be taken to include a
confirmation of the legal usufruct over the deceased's share of
the community.8 1
More serious problems arise when the testament purports to
give the surviving spouse more than he would have acquired
if decedent had died intestate. In Forstall v. Forstall3 2 the court
reduced to the disposable portion the testator's donation of all
his property to his spouse. The court reasoned that any disposi-
tion by the testator of his interest in the community nullified
the operation of article 916, so that the spouse was entitled either
to the disposable portion or to the usufruct of the forced portion,
since the former was all that the decedent could legally donate.33
31. It was early recognized that the legal usufruct could be confirmed by will.
In Grayson v. Sanford, 12 La. Ann. 646, 647 (1857), it was stated: "As the Act
of 1844 only gives the right of usufruct in the portion of the community coming
to the deceased, when he has left no will, it is clear that he can give, by his
testament, the usufruct of said portion, which would belong to the surviving
widow, without any will, or can declare that in the event of a particular con-
tingency, his widow shall inherit the portion of his property, which the law
authorizes him to bequeath." But see text accompanying note 62 inIra.
32. 28 La. Ann. 197 (1876).
33. Id. at 198: "The surviving widow is not entitled to the usufruct of this
two-thirds, because the deceased disposed by last will and testament of his share
of the community property. Article 916 must be construed with article 1493.
Taken together, the meaning is: Where there has been no testamentary disposition
of the disposable share of the pre-deceased husband or wife in the community
property, the survivor shall be entitled to a usufruct during his or her natural
life of so much of the share of the deceased in such community property as may
be inherited by such issue. The condition upon which the survivor shall have a
usufruct is, that the predeceased husband or wife, shall not have disposed of his
or her share, that is the share that he or she was permitted by law to dispose of."
87919651
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It should be noted that the court gave no consideration to the
fact that the proposed donee was the surviving spouse. In Suc-
cession of Moore,3 4 however, the deceased left to his widow the
disposable portion and the usufruct of the remainder. The heirs,
relying on Forstall, contended that the testator could donate only
the disposable portion, and that to award the usufruct would
violate the prohibition of article 171031 forbidding the burdening
of the legitime.36 The court rejected this contention on the basis
that only a testamentary disposition which was adverse to the
survivor precluded operation of article 916. Certainly it could
not be logically argued that when the testator attempts to give
his wife more than she would have otherwise taken, he is making
a disposition adverse to her. Since an encumbrance placed on
the legitime by law could not violate article 1710, neither could
a mere confirmation of such an encumbrance. Although the
court did not expressly overrule Forstall, it clearly advanced a
proposition inconsistent with the holding in Forstall37
The apparent conflict between Moore and Forstall was pre-
sented to the court in Winsberg v. Winsberg.8 The court, when
34. 40 La. Ann. 531, 4 So. 460 (1888).
35. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1710 (1870), quoted in note 11 supra.
36. The court reasoned that the article 916 usufruct was given by operation
of law; thus it could not be considered violative of article 1710, as the two
articles must be read together to give effect to both. This usufruct does not
constitute an abolition of the rights of forced heirship, but merely a modification
of the rights of forced heirship. See LA. R.S. 9:1891-1922 (Supp. 1964), which
contain other modification of the rights of forced heirship.
37. 40 La. Ann. 531, 538, 4 So. 460, 463 (1888) : "Hence, where the deceased
spouse, leaving issue of the marriage, and owning separate and common prop-
erty, bequeaths to the survivor the disposable portion and the usufruct of his
undisposed share in the community property, the disposition is valid and binding
on the heirs inheriting the undisposed portion, and the same is true where he
institutes the survivor his universal legatee, for, the bequest is not null, but re-
ducible to the disposable portion and the usufruct over the undisposed share."
(Emphasis added.)
The Moore court also distinguished Grayson v. Sanford, 12 La. Ann. 646, 647
(1857) and the unreported case of Succession of Denegre. In Grayson the de-
ceased left a will containing the following clause: "I will and bequeath to my
wife the use of all my property both personal and real during her life. However,
if any of my children sue for a portion during her life, I then will and bequeath
to her all of the property that I can dispose of by will, forever." Suit was brought
for partition and the question was what were the wife's rights under the will.
The court held that the usufruct was subject to a contingency-that of a child
suing for a partition-and upon the happening of such the wife was to take the
disposable portion in full ownership and the usufruct would be lost. In Denegre
the testator had bequeathed $10,000 to one of his daughters, and directed that
the rest of the property be administered for the benefit of his wife and children.
The court held that the testator had disposed of his share in the community
property, thus the widow was not entitled to the usufruct. Moore stated that
Denegre involved an incorrect interpretation of the will, and intimated that the
widow should have been allowed the usufruct.
38. 233 La. 67, 96 So. 2d 44 (1957).
faced with facts identical to Forstall, squarely overruled the
latter and applied the reasoning of Moore: if a legacy of the
disposable portion to the surviving spouse was not adverse to
her, much less was a legacy of decedent's entire estate. Thus
the usufruct attached to the forced portion after reduction of
the universal legacy to the spouse. The court approved of the
rationale that the prohibition of article 1710 was not violated
when the usufruct was given by operation of law and confirmed
by will. Since Winsberg, it has not been seriously argued that
article 1710 operates as a restriction on article 916. If any con-
flict exists between the two provisions, it appears that as the
later legislation article 916 should prevail.
Two conclusions may be suggested: if the testament con-
firms the laws of intestate succession, it should not be con-
sidered an adverse disposition, although Schiller may yet cast
some doubt on this proposition; and if the testator attempts to
give his spouse more than the laws of intestate succession would
allow, he has not made an adverse disposition. Moreover, it
seems that the strong policy shown by the enactment of article
91639 should dictate some clear indication by the testator that
he does not want the surviving spouse to have the usufruct be-
fore it will be denied. For example, if the testator leaves all
his property to the children with no mention of the wife, then
arguably under the clear policy of article 916 the same result
should follow. 40 Entirely different problems arise, however,
where dispositions made to strangers are subject to reduction
at the insistence of forced heirs. These problems are considered
in the next section.
To What Share Does the Usufruct Attach?
Article 916 provides that the survivor shall hold in usufruct
"so much of the share of the deceased in such community prop-
erty as may be inherited by such issue. ' ' 4 1 Article 1493, which
regulates the forced portion for descendants, states that the
forced portion is one-third if there is one child, one-half if there
are two children, and two-thirds if there are three or more
children.42 Reading this article in conjunction with article 916
39. See note 4 aupra and accompanying text.
40. But see Note, 18 LA. L. REV. 574, 577 (1958), which asserts a contrary
position.
41. LA. CIVL CODE art. 916 (1870), quoted in note 2 aupra.
42. Id. art. 1493: "Donations inter vivos or mortis cau8a can not exceed two-
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implies that the respective forced portion is the minimum to
which the usufruct will attach.
43
If the legitime of the children may be fulfilled only by re-
duction of excessive donations, does the usufruct attach to the
part necessary to make up the forced portion? Under Moore and
Winsberg it is clear that a disposition of all or part of the de-
cedent's property to the surviving spouse does not constitute
an adverse disposition, and Moore further states that an adverse
disposition of part of the property, that is, the portion given to
a stranger, only prevents the usufruct from attaching to that
portion of the property which is affected. Thus, it is clear that
if the disposable portion is given to a stranger, the usufruct will
not attach to that part. If the disposition to the stranger is more
than disposable portion, it becomes important to determine
whether the usufruct will attach to the excess passing to the
heirs by reduction. There are two possibilities: one is that since
the excess over the disposable portion passes by intestate succes-
sion, the usufruct should attach, since it is a part of the laws on
intestate succession; and the other is that the question should
not be what actually happens, but rather, what intention was
evidenced by the disposition, and as the disposition itself indi-
cates that the testator did not wish his spouse to have any part
of this property, the usufruct should not attach. In terms of
policy, therefore, the problem seems to be one of balancing the
interests of the wife against the desirability of giving the fullest
possible effect to the testator's wishes, and adhering as closely
as possible to the principles of forced heirship. Realization of
the policy of article 916, however, indicates that the spouse
should be denied the usufruct in this situation.
Remarriage - Termination of the Usufruct
The usufruct under article 916 continues during the life
of the surviving spouse, provided he does not remarry.44 Re-
marriage operates as a resolutory condition extinguishing the
thirds of the property of the disposer, it he leaves, at his decease, a legitimate
child; one-half, if he leaves two children; and one-third, if he leaves three or a
greater number.
"Under the name of children are included descendants of whatever degree they
be, it being understood that they are only counted for the child they represent."
43. See Oppenheim, The Usufruct of the Surviving Spouse, 18 TuL. L. REv.
181 (1943).
44. LA. CivIL CODE art. 916 (1870): "This usufruct shall cease, however,
whenever the survivor shall enter into a second marriage."
(Vol. XXV882
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usufruct, and the surviving spouse then becomes a debtor of his
children and must account to them for the things over which he
enjoyed the usufruct.45
Three types of usufructs must be carefully distinguished.
First, the usufruct created by operation of law alone under
article 916. Second, a confirmation of such a usufruct by will,
that is, a legacy of the usufruct under conditions in which article
916 would have operated in intestacy. This type of usufruct was
upheld in Succession of Moore 6 as not violating article 1710's
prohibition against burdening the legitime, on the ground that
the usufruct was given by operation of law and the two articles
must be construed together to give effect to both, so that a mere
testamentary confirmation of this usufruct could not violate
article 1710. Third, a testamentary usufruct bequeathed to the
survivor over the decesed's community property under condi-
tions in which article 916 was inapplicable. This type of usufruct
is valid only to the extent that it does not impinge upon the
legitime. If this usufruct does exceed the disposable portion, it
violates article 1710, since the Moore rationale is inapplicable
if article 916 is not operative.
Only two cases are seemingly deviate with this requirement.47
In both the testator had confirmed the usufruct by will and the
court reasoned that this transformed the legal usufruct into a
testamentary usufruct. As a testamentary usufruct, it fell out-
side the scope of article 916, including the latter's termination-
upon-remarriage rule. The court's conclusion, that a simple con-
firmation of the legal usufruct was sufficient to transform it
into a pure testamentary usufruct, was probably based upon a
failure to distinguish between the three types of usufructs. As
these were only simple confirmations of the legal usufructs, they
should have been placed in the second classification of usufructs
and, as such, they should have been subject to the termination-
upon-remarriage rule.48
45. Kelley v. Kelley, 198 La. 338, 3 So. 2d 841 (1941); Burdin v. Burdin,
171 La. 7, 129 So. 651 (1930) ; Succession of Gilmore, 154 La. 353, 90 So. 676
(1922) ; In re Tutorship of Jones, 22 La. Ann. 497 (1870) ; Dubois v. Police
Jury of Grant Parish, 165 So. 468 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1936); Succession of
Franklin, 127 So. 767 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1930).
46. 40 La. Ann. 531, 4 So. 460 (1888).
47. Succession of Carbajal, 154 La. 1060, 98 So. 666 (1924) ; Smith v. Nelson,
121 La. 170, 46 So. 200 (1908). Smith v. Nelson, however, was not a proper
case for the application of article 916, since the heirs were issue of a former
marriage. Carbajal was a situation clearly coming within the terms of article 916.
48. See note 47 supra.
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Had the Moore rationale been presented to the court, it seems
that the heirs would have prevailed in the deviant cases, since
under the court's retasoning article 916 was inapplicable. If ar-
ticle 916 is inapplicable, nothing prevents application of article
1710. Furthermore, refusal to apply the Moore rationale to the
termination provision of article 916 seems undesirable. If the
surviving wife remarries, she presumably acquires a new means
of support, eliminating the need for the usufruct.49 In any event,
the testator should not be able to defeat the restrictions provided
by article 916 by simply confirming the right there provided.
Security
Civil Code article 55850 requires the usufructuary to post
security to insure his performance as a prudent administrator.
However, applying by analogy article 560,51 which exempts the
father or mother from the requirement of posting security when
they have a legal usufruct over the estate of their children, the
courts very early decided that the usufructuary under article 916
was not required to give security.52 This rule was developed in
an era when immovable property represented the major source
of wealth - thus potential injury to the naked owner was slight.
Today, most wealth is in movable property and the possibilities
49. If the surviving husband is continuing the operation of a community busi-
ness and he remarries, the usufruct should be terminated, since under Louisiana
law the profits from the business would fall into the new community. Allowing
the usufruct to continue would result in a stranger impinging upon the legitime of
the children of the first marriage.
50. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 558 (1870) : "The usufructuary must give security
that he will use, as a prudent administrator would do, the movables and im-
movables subject to the usufruct, and that he will faithfully fulfill all the obliga-
tions imposed on him by law, and by the title under which his usufruct is
established."
51. See id. art. 560: "Neither the father nor mother, having the legal usufruct
of the estate of their children, nor the seller, nor the donor, under the reservation
of the usufruct, is required to give this security."
52. This result is supported by the decision in Taylor v. Taylor, 189 La. 1084,
181 So. 543 (1938), holding that the usufruct under the marital fourth, article
Costello, 158 So. 2d 850 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964) ; contra, Waring v. Zuntz, 16
to article 560. The Taylor court stated in dictum that not only were the marital
fourth and the usufruct of the surviving spouse to be so favored, but also that
the widow's homestead (article 2382) and the situation expressly covered by
article 560-the usufruct of the parents over the estate of their children-fell
into the same category. As legal usufructs, Taylor would free each from the
security requirements. See Canal Bank & Trust Co. v. Liuzza, 175 La. 53, 143
So. 2 (1932) ; Leury v. Mayer, 122 La. 468, 47 So. 839 (1908) ; Succession of
Dielman, 119 La. 101, 43 So. 972 (1907) ; Succession of Glancey, 114 La. 1051,
38 So. 826 (1905) ; Boisse v. Dickson, 31 La. Ann. 741 (1879) ; Succession of
Heckert, 160 So. 2d 375 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964) State Dep't of Highways v.
Costello, 158 So.2d 850 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964) ; contra, Waring v Zuntz, 16
La. Ann. 49 (1861).
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of injury to the naked owner by the usufructuary are correspond-
ingly increased. As a corollary to the increased potential injury,
the need for security increases. One recent case illustrates the
need for security where the form of wealth subject to the usufruct
is changed. In State Department of Highways v. Costello5" the
highway department expropriated certain land which was sub-
ject to the surviving spouse's usufruct. The children, naked
owners, opposed the withdrawal of the funds from the registry
of the court by the father, relying on article 613,' 4 which pro-
vides that the usufruct expires before the death of the usu-
fructuary, when there is a loss, extinction, or destruction of
the thing subject to the usufruct. The court held that mere
change in form of the thing subject to the usufruct was insuf-
ficient to extinguish the usufruct. Although this result appears
proper under the general rules of usufruct, it re-emphasizes the
need for some sort of security. Prior to the expropriation the
naked owners were protected in part by the form of property
subject to the usufruct, but due to events beyond their control
this protection was lost and they became dependent upon the
good faith of the usufructuary.
Civil Code article 621 provides the only protection available
to the naked owner whose usufructuary is not required to give
security.55 This article provides that if the usufructuary abuses
his right of enjoyment, the naked owners may have the usufruct
decreed extinct or the judge may allow the naked owners to take
possession of the property subject to the usufruct on condition
that they pay annually the usufructuary a sum fixed by the
judge in proportion to the value of the property. This remedy,
however, is a last resort for the naked owner, since gross abuse
must be shown before relief may be granted.5 6
53, 158 So. 2d 850 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
54. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 613 (1870) : "The usufruct expires before the death
of the usufructuary, by the loss, extinction or destruction of the thing subject
to the usufruct .... "
55. Id. art. 621 : "The usufruct may cease by the abuse which the usufructuary
makes in his enjoyment, either in committing waste on the estate, or in suffering
it to go to decay, for want of repairs, or in abusing in any other manner, the
things subject to the usufruct.
"In such cases, the judge may, according to the circumstances, decree the
absolute extinction of the usufruct, or order that the owner shall reenter into the
enjoyment of the property subject to the usufruct, on condition that he shall pay
annually to the usufructuary or his representatives, until the usufruct expires,
a sum which shall he fixed on by the judge in proportion to the value of the
property subject to the usufruct."
56. Thomas v. Thomas, 73 So. 2d 482 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1954) ; Magee v.
Gatlin, 51 So. 2d 154 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1951).
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Canal Bank v. Liuzza 7 illustrates clearly the inadequacies
of the remedies available to children who inherit subject to the
usufruct of the surviving spouse, and it shows the precarious
task of a court if it tries to provide additional protection. In
this case the widow was placed in possession of the estate, half
in her own right, and half in usufruct over the children's share.
The widow then placed funds subject to the usufruct in the
hands of her brother for investment. He promptly squandered
these funds. Later the widow gave the plaintiff bank an un-
secured note. In order to effect a settlement with the children
the widow renounced the usufruct and consented that her part
of some immovable property go to the heirs in part satisfaction
of their share of the estate. Plaintiff bank brought suit on the
note, alleging that the partition was made to place the property
beyond the widow's creditors, and asked that the transfer to
the children be rescinded. The court gave judgment on the note,
but denied plaintiff's demand that the transfer be rescinded.
The court pointed out that the Civil Code articles 33115 and
331859 gave the children a legal mortgage on the property of the
surviving spouse "reckoning from the closing of the inventory."
The court reasoned that since the children could have recorded
and foreclosed under their mortgage, the partition by the widow
gave the children no greater rights than that which they already
possessed ;', and thus the transfer of the property was valid.
The application of article 3318 in this case seems doubtful; its
language seems to indicate its purpose was to give the heirs
protection in the interim between death and appointment of an
administrator, during which interim care of the succession prop-
erty was entrusted to the surviving spouse."' Moreover, the
57. 175 La. 53, 143 So. 2 (1932).
58. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3311 (1870) : "The law alone in certain cases gives
to the creditor a mortgage on the property of his debtor, without it being requisite
that the parties should stipulate it ; this is called legal mortgage.
"It is also called tacit mortgage, because it is established by the law without
the aid of any agreement."
59. Id. art. 3318: "There is legal mortgage, reckoning from the closing of the
inventory, on the property of the surviving husband or wife, or heirs, who have
been invested by the inventory with the care of the property of the community
or succession, until they are relieved from their care or a partition has been
made."
60. Under id. arts. 3342, 3347, and 3356 it is required that the inventory be
recorded before it will be effective against third parties; thus it appears that
the children in Liuzza were given greater rights than that which they already
possessed.
61. See id. art. 1041, replaced by LA. CODE OF CIIL PROCEDURE arts. 3094,
3098, 3181 (1960). See also id. art. 3151, which provides for security to be
posted by the administrator.
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jurisprudence now appears settled that the failure of the sur-
viving spouse to take an inventory of the succession does not
cause loss of the legal usufruct of article 916.62 As the taking
of the inventory is a prerequisite to the operation of article 3318,
this remedy must be considered illusory, since it is defeasible
by the usufructuary's failure to take the inventory. It should be
noted that the remedy allowed by article 6213 was available to
the heirs in Liuzza. A possible consequence of this remedy would
be judgment creditor status for the heirs, but in such case they
would be forced to compete for first place with the bank.4
It can be readily seen, therefore, that with the change in the
form of wealth in modern society, the requirement of security
becomes of the utmost importance. It is suggested that the
courts reconsider this need and require the surviving spouse to
post security.
Inheritance Tax Problems
The Louisiana inheritance tax is levied upon all inheritances,
legacies, and donations made in contemplation of death, unless
otherwise specifically exempted.6 5 As to the surviving spouse's
usufruct two questions must be considered: first, is the spouse's
usufruct a taxable item under the state inheritance tax law;
second, may the heirs defeat the usufructuary's right of enjoy-
ment by refusing to pay the inheritance taxes?
62. See Burdin v. Burdin, 171 La. 7, 129 So. 651 (1930) ; Thomas v. Blair,
111 La. 685, 35 So. 811 (1903) ; Gryder v. Gryder, 37 La. Ann. 638 (1885) ;
Succession of Viand, 11 La. Ann. 297 (1856) ; contra, Succession of Landier, 51
La. Ann. 968, 25 So. 938 (1899) ; Saloy v. Chexnaidre, 14 La. Ann. 567 (1859).
63. See note 55 supra, and accompanying text.
64. It seems that the heirs in this case would be forced to obtain, first, extin-
guishment of the usufruct under article 621 of the Civil Code and, second, a judg-
ment against the widow so that they would have the status of a judgment
creditor.
LA. CIVIL CODE art. 549 (1870) provides: "If the usufruct includes things,
which can not be used without being expended or consumed, or without their
substance being changed, the usufructuary has a right to dispose of them at his
pleasure, but under the obligation of returning the same quantity, quality and
value to the owner, or their estimated price, at the expiration of the usufruct."
Arguably, it seems that the heirs could, under this article, be classified as revendi-
cating owners and as such should prime all creditors of the usufructuary.
65. LA. R.S. 47:2401 (1950) : "There is hereby levied a tax upon all inherit-
ances, legacies and donations and gifts made in contemplation of death, except
such as are hereinafter specifically exempted."
The exemptions listed in id. 47:2402 are: a $5,000,00 exemption on gifts to
a direct descendant by blood or affinity, or to a surviving spouse or ascendant
of the deceased; a $1,000.00 exemption on gifts to collateral relations of deceased,
which includes brothers and sisters by affinity; a $500.00 exemption on gifts to a
stranger; and any gifts to charitable, religious, or educational institutions located
within the State of Louisiana.
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Taxability of the Usufruct
In Succession of Marsa6 6 the deceased died intestate leaving
a wife and children of the marriage. The tax collector contended
that the usufruct was acquired by inheritance, thus taxes were
due on the value of the usufruct. The court held that the usu-
fruct was not acquired by inheritance but by "operation of law."
It was reasoned that, although the usufruct is defeasible at the
will of the deceased, it is nevertheless a right conferred by law
which enters into and forms part of the marriage contract.6T
Reliance was placed upon Succession of Teller,68 in which it was
stated that the child of the marriage inherits the deceased's
share in the community subject to the usufructuary rights of the
surviving parent.6 9
Succession of Norton70 makes a startling extension of the
Marsal rule. In Norton the wife died intestate leaving a husband
and children of the marriage. The children, as heirs in the near-
est degree, renounced the succession. The husband, as heir in the
next degree,7 1 accepted, and the tax collector claimed that as
a result of the renunciation a tax was due upon the value of the
whole estate inherited by the husband. On the other hand, the
husband claimed the right to deduct the value of the usufruct
he would have taken absent the renunciation, as under the
Marsal rule. The court agreed with the husband, reasoning that
under Marsal he acquired the usufruct by operation of law; the
only interest passing by inheritance was that which the first
forced heirs renounced, the naked ownership. This reasoning
implies that the usufruct was in existence for some period prior
to the time the surviving spouse took the naked ownership by
renunciation and confusion extinguished the usufruct.7 2
66. 118 La. 212, 42 So. 778 (1907); accord, Succession of Gremillion v.
Downs, 1.65 So. 481 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1936).
67. This reasoning was followed in Succession of Baker, 129 La. 74, 55 So.
714 (1911), where the court held that the confirmation by will was not sufficient
to change the legal usufruct into a testamentary usufruct for the purpose of
taxes. Accord, Succession of Brown, 94 So. 2d 317 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1957)
Succession of Lynch, 145 So. 42 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1932).
68. 49 La. Ann. 281, 21 So. 265 (1897).
69. Id. at 282, 21 So. at 265.
70. 157 So. 2d 909 (l.a. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
71. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts, 915, 948 (1870) ; cf. Pali v. Heroman, 211 La.
64, 29 So.2d 473 (1947).
72. It is well settled, however, that the usufruct arises at the moment of death.
See Succession of Marsal, 118 La. 212, 42 So. 778 (1907) ; Boyle v. Sibley, 22
La. Ann. 446 (1870) ; Succession of Smith, 9 La. Ann. 107 (1854) ; Succession




Two analytical tools which aid in understanding Norton may
be suggested. First, language in Marsal possibly indicates that
the author-in-title of the usufruct is not the deceased spouse but
the heir. If this be true, then obviously there could be no in-
heritance tax, as the right passes from a living person to the
surviving spouse, rather than from the deceased. The other
possible rationale finds its basis in the language of article 916:
"[T]he survivor shall hold a (sic) usufruct, during his or her
natural life, so much of the share of the deceased in such com-
munity property as may be inherited by such issue. ' ' 73 (Emphasis
added.) The usufruct, therefore, could not exist on property not
inherited by issue of the marriage.
Obviously, while superficially in line with Marsal, Norton in
fact deviates from the former's rationale. Under the Civil Code
it is clear that a renouncing heir is treated as never having re-
ceived the succession, and that heirs in the next degree are
treated as having succeeded to the inheritance from the moment
of deceased's death.74 How then could the renouncing heirs in
Norton serve as authors-in-title of a susfruct which would never
have come into existence? The dissent appears to have adopted
the correct approach, reasoning that under article 946 the heirs
who renounce are treated as never having existed, so that no
usufruct was created under the terms of article 916.75 The result
that no usufruct was created would also follow under the other
suggested rationale. It is fundamental that a renouncing heir is
treated as never having inherited.
Even if the suggested analysis of Norton is accepted, there
still remains the need to distinguish between the two closely
related fact situations, which seem to compel totally different
73. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 916 (1870), quoted in note 2 supra.
74. Id. art. 946: "Though the succession be acquired by the heir from the
moment of the death of the deceased, his right is in suspense, until he decide
whether he accepts or rejects it.
"If the heir accept, he is considered as having succeeded to the deceased from
the moment of his death; if he rejects it, he is considered as never having re-
ceived it."
Id. art. 948: "When all the heirs in the nearest degree renounce the succession,
which is accepted by those in the next degree, these last are considered as having
succeeded directly and immediately to the rights and effects of the succession
from the moment of the death of the deceased.
"Therefore the heirs, thus succeeding by the renunciation of relations nearer in
degree, transmit the succession to their own heirs, if they die before having
accepted it, in the same manner as if they had succeeded in the first degree to
the deceased."
75. 157 So. 2d at 910-11.
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tax results. Assume that H and W had two children, C' and C2,
and that W died survived by H and the two children. If both
children renounce the succession of W, composed entirely of her
half of the community property, in favor of H, the Norton facts
would arise, and under the analysis suggested above there should
be a tax upon the entire succession passing to H, without any
consideration for the value of a hypothetical usufruct. On the
other hand, if C1 renounced his interest in W's succession in
favor of H, and C2 accepted in his own behalf, under Louisiana
jurisprudence the order of succession would be changed and C1
would be treated as having accepted the succession and then
donated it to H.76 There would be someone to serve as author-
in-title of the entire usufruct, albeit the usufruct would be par-
tially extinguished by confusion when C1 donated his naked
ownership to H. It seems that here the Marsal rule should apply
in full force, exempting the entire usufruct from taxation. The
same result should follow under the other rationale, since the
usufruct would be preserved by the one child who inherited.
The general rule that there is no death tax upon the surviving
spouse's usufruct does not hold true in all cases. Under the fed-
eral estate tax law the value of the, usufruct does not escape
taxation, as the basis for the tax includes "the value of all prop-
erty to the extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the
time of his death. ' 77 Further the state, through the estate trans-
fer tax78 which siphons part of the revenue from the federal
estate tax, receives the benefit of the federal law's inclusion of
the value of the usufruct. It has been suggested that the federal
rule that the spouse's usufruct is subject to the federal estate
tax is of doubtful validity in light of the Erie doctrine and state
decisions such as Marsal.79 It is submitted that the Erie doctrine
has no application, since what interests are subject to the estate
tax is a federal question, and as such is decided according to,
federal law.
76. E.g., Aurienne v. Mt. Olivet, 153 La. 451, 96 So. 29 (1923).
77. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2033. It should be noted that this is not the
sole basis for the tax. See, e.g., id. § 2035 (transaction in contemplation of death)
id. § 2037 (transfers taking effect at death) ; and id. § 2038 (revocable transfers).
78. LA. R.S. 47:2431-2435 (1950). This tax was enacted for the express
purpose of obtaining the full benefit of the credit allowed by the United States on
the federal estate tax. See Comment, 22 TUL. L. REv. 635 (1948).




Effect of Non-payment of the Inheritance Taxes by the Heirs
Even though under some of the fact situations set forth
above, the taker of the naked ownership in the succession prop-
erty will be liable for an inheritance tax, it should not be im-
mediately assumed that this constitutes an unfair burden. True,
the naked owner will not receive any immediate income from
the property subject to the usufruct. However, the statute is
carefully drafted so that the tax is computed only upon the
present value of the naked ownership, discounted by the life
expectancy of the usufructuary.5 0 The naked owner's plight is
thus not too heavy. Should, then, the naked owner's refusal to
pay inheritance taxes prejudice the usufructuary's enjoyment
of his rights as a surviving spouse?
Article 2951 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that
no judgment of possession shall be rendered unless the inherit-
ance taxes have been paid, or satisfactory proof has been given
that no taxes are due, or the maximum amount claimed by the
tax collector has been deposited in the registry of the court. In
addition to this general necessity for a judgment of possession,
the legislature has enacted certain statutes which prohibit banks,
homestead associations, corporations, and other depositary in-
stitutions from delivering the deceased's property to anyone until
satisfactory proof is given that the inheritance tax laws have
been complied with."' The usual mode of proof is a judgment of
possession issued by the court having jurisdiction over the suc-
cession proceedings.
A reading of these statutes leads to the conclusion that the
usufructuary is not entitled to enjoyment of the property until
the inheritance taxes are paid. It may be hastily surmised that
the heirs may therefore deny the usufructuary this enjoyment
by failing to pay the taxes. However, this would be inexact,
80. Succession of Norton, 157 So. 2d 909 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963) ; Succession
of Lewis, 12 So. 2d 7 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1943) ; In re Stelly's Estate, 185 So. 637
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1939). For a complete understanding of the proper computa-
tion method, see MCMAHON & RUBIN, PLEADINGS AND JUDICIAL FoRMs ANNOTAT-
ED, 11 LSA-C.C.P. Form No. 807 (1964).
81. See, e.g., LA. R.S. 6:66 (1950) (banks) ; id. 6:789 (homestead associa-
tions); id. 6:842 (federal savings and loan association) ; id. 12:503 (corpora-
tions). However, motivated by a desire to afford the surviving spouse some
means of support in the interim between deceased's death and a judgment of
possession, the legislature enacted special statutes allowing the surviving spouse
to withdraw some funds from certain depositary institutions. See, e.g., id. 9:1513
(Supp. 1964) (banks-1,000.00) ; id. 6:751.1 (homestead associations--1,-




because certain remedies are accorded to the surviving spouse
which operate to prevent this inequitable result. If the surviving
spouse is also the succession representative, he can eliminate
the problem by paying the taxes and then claim compensation
from the heirs when he delivers their virile share to them. Ap-
pointment of anyone else as succession representative practically
insures payment of the taxes, since his discharge is conditional
on payment.82 Finally, if no succession representative is ap-
pointed, and the heirs refuse the pay the tax, the tax collector
has the authority to obtain a judgment and order sufficient suc-
cession property sold to satisfy this judgment.8 3
Conclusion
Although the usufruct of the surviving spouse has decreased
in importance due to the advent of various public and private
programs, it seems that the institution still plays an important
role in affording financial security to the surviving spouse.
Some improvements on the present law may be suggested.
First, the requirement of issue of the marriage should be strictly
construed; second, the court should look to the intention of the
testator to determine what constitutes a disposition adverse to
the surviving spouse; third, the jurisprudence allowing the usu-
fruct to continue after the survivor's remarriage should be dis-
approved; and fourth, the surviving spouse should be required
to post security.
Charles G. Gladney
PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN SPOUSES
Among the numerous articles of the Louisiana Civil Code
dealing with marriage are those governing donations and con-
tracts between spouses. But the code provisions are sketchy
and the jurisprudence slight, especially on the rules affecting
interspousal donations. The purpose of this Comment is to
clarify the law of interspousal transactions generally.
82. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2951 (1960) ; LA. R.S. 47:2407(c)(1950).
83. LA. R.S. 47:2408(b) (1950); id. 47:2409(c).
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